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Private neighbourhoods as club
economies and shareholder
democracies
Private Siedlungen als Clubökonomien und Shareholder-Demokratien
Georg Glasze
 
Private neighbourhoods as “privatisation of public
space”?
1 In  1989 Barton and Silverman announced “a quiet  revolution in local  politics”:  the
spread of private neighbourhoods in the USA (p. 31). Nelson, a former consultant of the
US Secretary of the Interior, thinks that private neighbourhoods might become “the
fundamental building block for the metropolitan political and economic organisation.
(…) We would have two basic forms of private property ownership – the condominium
form (or residential community association) for residential property and the corporate
form for business property” (Nelson, 1989, p. 51). 
2 There is no reliable inventory of private neighbourhoods in the USA. Therefore, the
membership of the Community Associations Institute (CAI),  the lobby association of
private  neighbourhoods,  is  the  best  source  for  a  list  of  private  neighbourhoods.
According to the figures of the CAI, the number of private neighbourhoods in the USA
grew rapidly from around 10 000 in 1970 to more than 200 000 in 1998. As membership
is voluntary, that list underestimates the number of private neighbourhoods. At the
turn  of  the  century,  at  least  one  out  of  six  American  is  living  in  a  private
neighbourhood. In the fastest growing regions of the US, more than half of all  new
home sales are in a private neighbourhood. Every fifth of these private neighbourhoods
in the USA is gated and guarded (Treese, 1999). First studies in other regions of the
world allow the assumption that there is  also a growing trend towards private and
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often guarded neighbourhoods in many countries in Latin America,  Africa and Asia
(Webster, Glasze and Frantz, 2002; Glasze, 2002).
3 The  interest  of  the  media1 and  the  social  sciences  in  private  neighbourhoods  has
primarily  focused  on  guarded  neighbourhoods.  Contemporary  processes  of  urban
development seem manifested in the gates, walls and fences of these complexes. Thus,
the guarded private neighbourhoods are taken by many authors as an extreme form
(Gmünder,  Grillon  and  Bucher,  2000,  p. 193)  of  a  “privatisation  of  public  spaces”
(referring to the USA for example: Judd 1995, p. 163; Lichtenberger, 1999; Frantz, 2000,
p. 112; Le Goix, 2002; and referring to other regions of the world for example: Connell,
1999, p. 417; Meyer and Bähr, 2001, p. 316; Coy and Pöhler, 2002, p. 355). 
4 The value of  “public  space” and its  endangering through “privatisation” is  a  much
quoted topos within the critique of contemporary urbanism. The reason may be that
the concept of “public space” is a very powerful normative idea (Habermas, 1990, p. 20;
Caldeira,  1996,  p. 315).  However,  “public  space”  and  “privatisation”  are  extremely
vague analytical categories (Glasze, 2001b, p. 161 et seqq.). Therefore, it often remains
unclear what exactly is privatised and how privatisation is carried out. The writings on
“privatisation of public space” dichotomise between the public realm and the private
realm, they often focus unilaterally on material changes in space and therefore risk
blocking from view a more profound and differentiated analysis of the complex socio-
economic and  socio-political  changes  which  are  underway  with  the  spreading  of
private neighbourhoods (cf. Soja, 2000, p. 320; Webster, 2002, p. 397 et seqq.). 
5 Based on the writings of some colleagues in the “research network on private urban
governance”2 as well as on empirical work in the US, Lebanon and Europe I will propose
two  analytical  approaches  which  heuristically  might  be  more  fruitful.  In  order  to
understand the economics of private neighbourhoods I will use the club goods theory.
Furthermore,  in order to portray the political  changes underway I  will  analyse the
private neighbourhoods as  private residential  governments.  In this  perspective,  the
spreading of private neighbourhoods might be described as the establishment of a new
territorial organisation on a local level which enables the exclusive consumption of
collective goods, and in which political decisions are taken in a kind of shareholder
democracy.
 
A typology of private neighbourhoods
6 In traditional neighbourhoods the open spaces (streets, parks, footways etc.) as well as
a lot of common facilities (public libraries, swimming pools, schools etc.) are owned by
public authorities and governed by local government. In the private neighbourhoods,
the  open  spaces  and  the  common  services  are  managed  and  regulated  by  a  self-
governing organisation. In spite of differing juridical contexts one can describe three
main  organisational  types  of  private  neighbourhoods  which  differ  in  the  way  that
property rights for the open spaces and facilities as well as for individual housing units
are assigned (McKenzie, 1994, p. 94 et seqq.; Treese, 1999, p. 3; Glasze, 2001a, p. 43): 
Condominiums: In addition to the individual property of their piece of land and house or
their flat, the owners hold titles to an undivided interest in the common property of streets,
green  spaces,  facilities,  etc.  Thus  every  owner  automatically  becomes  member  in  the
homeowner association. 
• 
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Stock-cooperatives: The cooperative owns both, the housing units as well as the common
spaces and facilities. The individuals purchase a share in the entire complex. That share
offers the right to use an individual unit as well as the common areas and facilities. The
assembly of the cooperative appoints the detailed rights of use.
Corporations: The common spaces and facilities are property of the corporation. In those
cases where a covenant attached to the deed for a residence or a residential lot makes each
owner “automatically” holding shares in the corporation, it is often also called home owner
association. In other cases where there is no accordance between the shareholders and the
people  owning  or  renting  the  housing  units  Foldvary  (2002)  has  labelled  this  form
“proprietary neighbourhoods” – referring to an idea of Spencer Heath MacCallum. 
7 There is a correlation between the physical structure of the neighbourhoods and the
form  of  organisation:  Most  private  apartment  complexes  are  organized  as
condominiums or cooperatives. Private settlements with predominantly single family
homes are most often organised as corporations3. In many countries of the world the
first private neighbourhoods have been secondary residences – the so-called resorts.
Investors who combine such secondary residences with hotels or other tourist facilities
tend to organise them as proprietary neighbourhoods in order to keep the power of
decision over the development, the management and marketing of the whole complex.
 
Private Neighbourhoods as club economies
From local public goods to territorial club goods
8 The self-administration of private neighbourhoods provides the inhabitants with many
collective goods like green spaces, water supply, recreational facilities etc.4 Economists
have  justified  the  fact  that  even  in  market  economies  some  collective  goods  are
traditionally provided by public organisations due to market failure. That is to say the
market fails to provide goods when nobody can be excluded from consumption and
there is no competition, no rivalry in consuming. Free-riders could profit from goods
like clean air or urban green spaces without paying for them. Then, these goods are not
sufficiently provided by the private sector and the public sector has to step in. On the
other hand, for private goods like food there is rivalry about the consumption and third
parties can be excluded from consuming. Sometimes, commons are differentiated as a
third category of goods which are competed but for which the exclusion criteria are
hard to meet. Consequently, these goods often suffer from overuse, as for example the
fish population in the deep sea (fig. 1).
 
Figure 1. Public goods, private goods and territorial club goods.
9 However,  already  in  1956  the  American  economist  Tiebout  pointed  out  that  many
collective goods which were generally described as public goods are local public goods
• 
• 
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in the sense that they benefit primarily people who stay at a certain locality. He gave
local security services, green spaces or public swimming pools as examples of such local
public  goods.  According  to  Tiebout,  these  local  public  goods  could  be  provided  by
competing neighbourhoods if the following conditions were met5:
The local public goods in the neighbourhoods are financed by local taxes of the inhabitants. 
The  households  are  fully  informed  and  choose  their  neighbourhood  according  to  their
preferences (food-voting).
10 It was Foldvary (1994) who showed that private neighbourhoods meet these conditions.
The self-administration (and as the case may be the enclosure) renders local public
goods completely excludable, solves the free-rider problem and assures that the fees of
the inhabitants are exclusively spent within the neighbourhood. 
11 Groups which collectively but exclusively share the consumption of specific goods on
the basis of ownership-membership arrangements have been named “clubs” and the
excludable  collective  goods  “club  goods”  (Buchanan,  1965).  Therefore  one  may
interpret  the  establishment  of  private  neighbourhoods  with  their  self-governing
organisation as the creation of club economies with territorial boundaries. 
 
The economic attractiveness of private neighbourhoods
12 The  analysis  of  private  neighbourhoods  as  club  economies  enables  to  explain  the
economic  attractiveness  of  these  complexes  for  developers,  local  governments  and
inhabitants:
Developers may profit from the fact that the establishment of a neighbourhood governance
structure with the power to exclude free riders as well as the power to regulate the use of
common  spaces  and  facilities  reduces  the  risk  of  an  economic  degradation  of  the
neighbourhood. Thus, the long-term risks in investing in large scale projects are reduced
and the developers are able to invest more in creating and maintaining shared facilities
(Weiss and Watts, 1989, p. 95). Furthermore, they can market not only the individual home
but also the club goods within in the neighbourhood as contractual tie-ins (Webster, 2002,
p. 405). 
Local governments may profit from private neighbourhoods being established within their
boundaries as they obtain a development which is self-financing and which adds to the local
base. 
And housing seekers  and inhabitants  may profit  from the level  and the quality  of  local
public goods supplied in private neighbourhoods. Private neighbourhoods offer a range of
services (e.g.  maintenance, 24 h-security,  solid waste collection) as well  as artificial  (e.g.
pool, tennis court, green spaces) and natural amenities (e.g. beach, view). Empirical research
has shown that the supply of  services and facilities  often play an important role in the
decision  for  this  kind  of  housing  –  especially  in  cities  where  the  public  sector  is  weak
(Pöhler,  1998; Leisch, 2002; Glasze, 2003).  Furthermore, the individual owners may profit
from stable home values as the self-administration assures a strict control of the social and
physical environment. 
 
Are public municipalities club economies too?
13 Webster (2002, p. 398) and Nelson (1989) have argued that in an economic perspective
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assumed.  Regarding the  supply  side,  one  has  to  state  that  the  differences  between
municipalities and private neighbourhoods are at least shrinking: Municipalities in the
USA,  as  in  Europe  and  many  other  parts  of  the  world  “in  recent  years  have  been
turning away from direct governmental provision of local services, instead contracting
for these services with private suppliers” (ibid., p. 47) just as it is the practice in private
neighbourhoods6.
14 If one leaves aside the question who provides a particular collective good and focuses
on  the  consumption,  one  has  to  distinguish  different  types  of  municipalities  with
regard  to  the  following  two  characteristics:  (a)  financing  and  (b)  socio-economic
homogeneity, or heterogeneity:
15 In a pure federal system, where the municipalities are exclusively or predominantly
financed by local property or income taxes as in the USA, the funding is quite similar to
private  neighbourhoods,  “a  set  of  shared  goods  is  (…)  financed  by  a  shared  cost
arrangement”  (Webster,  2002,  p. 400).  Consequently,  municipalities  with  mostly
affluent  inhabitants  are  rich  and  municipalities  with  mostly  poor  inhabitants  are
deprived. The rich municipalities are able to supply collective goods in higher quantity
and quality than the poor municipalities – more and better green spaces, swimming
pools, local security services, theatres and so on. The wealthy inhabitants who finance
these collective goods with their taxes profit from their high quality and quantity not
only by consuming but also through stable or increasing home values. Therefore, they
are likely to try preventing free riding by less affluent households, who do not generate
“adequate”  tax  revenues.  If  they  are  able  to  dominate  the  decision-making  of  the
council, they may use legal instruments to hinder the in-migration of poor households.
Danielson has shown that many rich suburban municipalities in the USA use zoning as
such an exclusionary instrument (1976, p. 1 et seqq.). Their councils establish public
regulations which restrict the development of multi-family buildings and thus limit the
in-migration of less affluent households7. Consequently, the local public goods in these
municipalities  become club  goods.  The  exclusion  mechanism is  the  same as  in  the
private  neighbourhoods:  distancing.  Hence,  many rich,  small,  socially  homogeneous
and mostly  suburban municipalities  in  the  USA work  de  facto  much like  a  private
neighbourhood.  “Zoning  provides  the  property  right  [over  open  spaces,  common
facilities etc.], local property taxes provide the membership fees, and the city council is
de  facto  a  private  board  of  directors”  (Nelson,  1989,  p. 46).  Regarding  big
municipalities,  Webster  is  certainly  right  when he  states  that  “few civic  goods  are
shared equally by all within a city and inclusion and exclusion are facts of urban life”
(2002, p. 409). Even a public library or a public swimming pool has to exclude in order
to  avoid  over-use  and  therefore  has  “club-like  consumption  characteristics”  (ibid.,
p. 398).  The  access  may  be  limited  to  people  living  in  the  specific  municipality  or
regulated by entrance fees – offering a temporary “membership in the club.”
16 However, if the financing of the municipalities is not based exclusively or primarily on
local sources as it is the case in countries with a centralised system like France, or if
there  are  vertical  or  horizontal  perequations  as  in  the  German  “cooperative
federalism”8, the above described mechanism does not work: the quantity and quality
of  supplied  collective  goods  does  not  vary  enormously  from  one  municipality  to
another. Therefore, the motivation to prevent free-riding and to exclude less affluent
households  is  smaller.  And  in  socially  heterogeneous  municipalities  the  decision-
making  of  the  council  has  to  focus  not  only  on  the  economic  interest  of  the
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municipality as a whole but has also to balance internally the different interests of the
(voting) inhabitants. 
17 Thus, there seems to be a fundamental difference between club economies established
as  private  neighbourhoods  (and  some  small  and  homogeneous  municipalities  as
described above) on the one hand side and club economies organising the consumption
of public facilities in every city on the other hand side: in a private neighbourhood,
only the people who are able to afford living in the neighbourhood are allowed to use,
for example, the recreational facilities. The use of a public swimming pool in a city has
to be regulated too, but the rules defining the rights of use are taken in a city council
where  –  ideally  –  the  interests  of  different  groups  of  the  society  are  represented.
Therefore,  in  socially  heterogeneous  municipalities  with  functioning  democratic
institutions, it is more likely that the city council takes into account the interests of
social  groups with little  economic power.  For example,  a  council  might decide that
every school class of the city is allowed to use the public swimming pool for one hour a
week – thus,  enabling children with a deprived family background to learn how to
swim. 
 
Private neighbourhoods as shareholder democracies
18 In  the  US  in  the  1990s  arose  a  discussion  of  the  self-administration  of  private
neighbourhoods as  a  new form of  territorial  organisation.  The lobby association of
private  neighbourhoods,  the Community  Association Institute  (CAI),  judged the  self
administration of private neighbourhoods as an ideal organisation of local democracy:
“... the most representative and responsive form of democracy found in America today”
9. And indeed, empirical studies have shown that functioning home owner associations
offer  new  possibilities  for  the  individual  inhabitant  to  become  involved  in  the
development  of  his  neighbourhood  and  may  foster  voluntary  engagement  on  a
neighbourhood scale (Barton and Silverman, 1989; Glasze, 2003). 
19 The  decision-making  in  private  neighbourhoods  follows  the  model  of  stock-
corporations.  In  such shareholder  democracies,  the  standards  of  equality  and open
decision-making are less rigid as in public politics. For stock-corporations this is hardly
seen as a problem assuming one dominant joint interest. However, even though most
private neighbourhoods are socially quite homogeneous, there are differing interests.
There  are  disagreements  between  inhabitants  and  the  developer  for  example  on
warranty issues, between absentee owners and inhabitants, for example on the charges
for  common  facilities,  between  households  with  children  and  households  without
children for example on the construction of a playground as well as between tenants
and owners for example on regulating the use of common facilities. In short: there are
politics within private neighbourhoods. 
20 If one looks at the constitutions of western nations, one finds several basic democratic
principles organising the political life on a national,  regional and local scale,  as for
example the principle of equality, the principle of the sovereignty of the people, the
principle of public decision-making and the principle of pluralistic decision-making. In
private  neighbourhoods,  the  imbalance  between  differing  interests  and  missing
democratic  institutions  often  leads  to  the  infringement  of  such  basic  democratic
principles (McKenzie, 1994, p. 122 et seqq.; Scott, 1999, p. 20 et seqq.; Silverman and
Barton, 1994, p. 141)10: 
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21 Violation of the principle of equality: In contrast to public municipalities, the suffrage
for the board of directors is not bound to the place of residence and citizen rights but
to  the  property.  Therefore  tenants  are  excluded  from  decisions  concerning  their
proper  neighbourhood.  Furthermore,  in  most  condominiums  and  corporations  the
voting rights are attributed according to the value of the property: Instead of “one man
one vote”, decisions are taken on the basis of “one Dollar one vote” (Frug, 1999, p. 171). 
Missing  “opposition”:  There  is  no  institutionalised  opposition  or  any  other  institution
assuring a pluralistic decision-making as it is or at least should be assured by parties in a
territorial organisation with public municipalities. Thus, the members of the councils have
privileged access to information and a privileged power to determine the agenda. Minorities
risk being dominated. 
Dictatorial and oligarchic structures: In proprietary neighbourhoods, the former investors
keep the majority of the property. Thus they are able to control the development of the
open spaces, facilities and services as well as to manage the complex in a profit-oriented
way.  However,  even  in  “normal”  home  owner  associations  the  former  investors  often
dominate the decision-making by keeping a part of the apartments or houses and/or by
making use of the voting power of friends, relatives or employees. 
In view of these deficiencies it is hardly astonishing that studies in the USA and Lebanon
have  found  a  lot  of  conflicts  within  the  private  neighbourhoods.  Consequently,  the
commitment  of  the  inhabitants  to  their  home  owner  association  often  is  very  limited
(Alexander, 1994, p. 148; Blakely and Snyder, 1997, p. 129; Glasze, 2003). 
 
Discussion: efficiency, democracy and individual life
opportunities
22 The example of  many suburban municipalities  in the USA has shown that  it  is  not
appropriate to dichotomize between “open, democratic and socially balanced” public
municipalities and “closed and secessionist” private neighbourhoods. For that reason, I
propose to rather evaluate case by case to what extent a given territorial organisation
assures an efficient supply with collective goods, allows a democratic decision-making,
provides equal life chances and does not endanger social coherence on a regional or
national scale. In this résumé I will try to sketch out such a critical analysis.
23 The efficiency argument speaks for the establishment of small club economies with a
direct  connection of  shared consumption and collective  cost  arrangements.  Private
neighbourhoods  give  “legal  protection  to  the  economic  right  over  shared
neighbourhood attributes” (Webster, 2002, p. 409). Formalised institutions organise the
property rights in these club economies and therefore enable a more efficient (private
market)  supply of  local  public  goods as  in heterogeneous and bigger municipalities
where there are no such direct and formalised arrangements. Consequently, several
urban  economists  judge  private  neighbourhoods  as  a  “natural  evolution”  of  urban
institutions  (Nelson,  1989;  Foldvary,  1994;  Webster,  2002).  However,  the  focus  on
“preferences”  as  main  variable  explaining  the  differences  between neighbourhoods
blocks from view that “most public services [are] regarded as desirable” (Frug, 1999,
p. 171)  and that  it  is  the economic (and to some extent social  and cultural)  capital
which determines the options on the housing market (Whiteman, 1983, p. 346 et seqq.).
In  the  long  run,  the  spread  of  private  neighbourhoods  would  lead  to  a  territorial
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capacity.  The provision with basic services like education, environmental quality or
health would directly depend on the individual wealth. Basic life opportunities would
be distributed in highly unequal  ways.  These examples make obvious that  a  purely
economic definition of public and local public goods which dominates the writings on
territorial  club economies tends to  neglect  the importance of  a  universal  and non-
discriminatory  supply  of  some services  for  assuring  social  cohesion,  environmental
quality and overcoming of social and/or geographical exclusion. In most countries of
the European Union the local authorities are partially or completely responsible for
assuring a universal and secure supply of many basic services like social care, education
and municipal engineering (cf. Lichtenberger, 1998). Within the European Community,
at  the latest  with the  treaty  of  Amsterdam,  official  politics  began to  recognize  the
importance of what are called “services of general interest”11 in the nomenclature of
the  European  Commission  (French:  “services  publics”,  German:  “Daseinsvorsorge”).
The “green paper on services of general interest” which has been published by the
Commission of the European Community in 2003 judges these services as “part of the
values shared by all European societies, (...) an essential element of the European model
of society,  (...)  [and] a pillar of  European citizenship” (Commission of the European
Communities,  2003,  p. 3).  That  is  not  to  say  the  European  Commission  promotes  a
provision of these services exclusively by public organisations – on the contrary, it is
highly probable that the Commission is continuing to encourage the liberalisation of
further markets. Nevertheless, the green paper allows the assumption that for social
and ecological reasons the Commission tends to leave the responsibility for assuring a
universal  and non-discriminatory  supply  of  these  “services  of  general  interest”  at
accessible prices to public and most often local authorities. These public authorities
may  either  provide  these  services  themselves  or  contract  for  these  services  with
private suppliers (Prodi, 2002; Commission of the European Communities, 2003).
24 Regarding the question of  democracy one has to differentiate between the internal
decision-making and the external politics of private neighbourhoods concerning their
social environment. Keating (1991) and Frug (1999) fear that the external politics of
socially homogeneous municipalities and private neighbourhoods will be absorbed by
the  search  for  an  optimal  satisfaction  of  the  inhabitants  and  won’t  bother  with
concepts  aiming  at  a  social  balance  on a  bigger  scale.  The  attempts  of  several
homeowner associations in the US and other parts of the world to secede from wider
public territorial organisations (cf. Anderson, 1996) validate that fear of a “secession of
the successful”12. Furthermore, in several years, the home owner associations of private
neighbourhoods in the USA might become a powerful lobby association on a regional
and even national scale.  Therefore the institutionalisation of a new form of private
urban governance risks (further) complicating social  balance and raising new social
barriers. Internally, the social homogeneity, the small scale and the institutionalisation
of  a  neighbourhood  organisation  may  foster  a  sense  of  community  and  voluntary
engagement. However, several studies have shown that the internal decision-making in
private  neighbourhoods  often  violates  basic  democratic principles.  While  the  basic
ideals  of  contemporary  civil  democracies  are  “equal  rights  and  chances  for  every
citizen”,  the  private  neighbourhoods  can  be  interpreted  as  territorial  shareholder
democracies, which bind political influence and individual life opportunities closely to
individual economic strength – the shares in the neighbourhood (Fig. 2). Therefore, the
political organisation in private neighbourhoods is returning to the days of a census
suffrage where political influence is institutionally based on status and class.  If  one
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bears in mind that the local arena is the “school of democracy” (Tocqueville), one has
to ask whether the private neighbourhoods are a good place to learn democracy. 
 




25 The  analysis  of  private  neighbourhoods  as  territorial  club  economies  explains  the
attractiveness  of  this  form of  housing for  developers,  local  governments  as  well  as
residents.  However,  the  writings  relating the  club goods-theory  with the  spread of
private  neighbourhoods  tend  to  ignore  the  social  construction  of  institutions,  the
differing  interests  in  society  and  the  unequal  distribution  of  power.  The
reconfiguration  of  the  territorial  organisation  which  is  underway  with  the
establishment of  private neighbourhoods serves specific  interests.  In a  society-wide
perspective one has to trade off carefully between the efficiency of such territorial club
economies and the secessionist effects of a political and organisational fragmentation.
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NOTES
1. Thus the German weekly paper Die Zeit reports: “In the mega cities of the South the rich are
fleeing to housing castles” (Grill B., Die Zeit, 18.05.2000: “In den Megastädten der Südhalbkugel
flüchten sich die Reichen in luxuriöse Wohnburgen”). The Berliner Morgenpost writes: “More and
more  Americans  retreat  to  fortresse-like  settlements”  (Schröder  E.,  Berliner  Morgenpost,
30.07.1997: “Immer mehr Amerikaner ziehen sich in festungsartige Siedlungen zurück”), and Le
Monde diplomatique describes under the title “The ‘private cities’ à la française” the development
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of “fortresses of the rich” in France (Belmessous H., Le Monde diplomatique, November 2002: “Des
‘Villes Privées’ à la française”).
2. www.gated-communities.de
3. In the nomenclature of the CAI private settlements with predominantly single family homes
and a corporation holding the title of the common areas is called “planned community” (Treese
C. J., 1999). Community Associations Factbook. Alexandria, VA, Community Associations Institute.
4. Goods in the sense of any material goods, services or infrastructure.
5. The other assumptions of Tiebout might be neglected in this context.
6. For a detailed analysis of the privatisation of formerly public provision one would have to
differentiate between formal (“organisational”) and material privatisation.
7. At  the same time these suburban municipalities  protect  themselves  from social  spending.
Comparable  patterns  can  be  observed  in  France,  where  small  suburban  municipalities  also
impede the in-migration of poor households. These municipalities liberate themselves from the
duty to construct social housing by paying a forfeit.
8. Article 72 of the German Constitutional Law demands from the central government despite a
federal  organisation  of  the  state  that  it  assures  an  “equality  of  life  circumstances”
(“Gleichwertigkeit der Lebensverhält-nisse”) for the whole territory. 
9. www.caionline.org/about/facts.cfr (10.12.2000).
10. In Arizona (USA) has been established an assocation who acts against the decision-making in
many home owner associations judged as undemocratic (www.pvtgov.org/pvtgov, 2.12.2001).
11. The term “services of general interest” cannot be found in the Treaty itself. The Commission
derived it from the term “services of general economic interest” in Article 16 of the Treaty. It
covers  both market  and non-market  services  which public  services  class  as  being of  general
interest and subject to specific obligation (European Commission, 2003, p. 6). The Treaty of Nice
recognises the right of access to services of general interest for the European citizens (Art. 36).
12. Reich R. B. (1991), “Secession of the Successful”, The New York Times Magazine, 20 January 1991,
pp. 16-17, 42-45.
ABSTRACTS
The spread of privately governed and often guarded neighbourhoods in many countries of the
world has been interpreted by several authors as a manifestation of a “privatisation of public
space”. However, it often remains unclear what exactly is privatised and how privatisation is
carried out. The paper presents two approaches which offer some deeper insights into the socio-
economic  and  socio-political  changes  which  are  underway  with  the  spread  of  private
neighbourhoods. On the one hand, the analysis of private neighbourhoods as club economies
explains the economic attractiveness of this form of housing. On the other hand, the study of
private settlements as a new form of territorial organisation shows that the political decisions
are  taken  in  a  kind  of  shareholder  democracy,  and  that  social  differences  become
institutionalised. 
Der in zahlreichen Ländern der Welt zu beobachtende Boom privater und vielfach bewachter
Wohnsiedlungen wird von einigen Autoren als Manifestation einer “Privatisierung öffentlicher
Räume” interpretiert. Dabei bleibt allerdings häufig unklar was und auf welche Weise privatisiert
wird. Der Beitrag stellt daher zwei Ansätze vor, die einen weitergehenden Einblick in die sozio-
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ökonomischen  und  sozio-politischen  Veränderungen  ermöglichen,  die  mit  der  Ausbreitung
privater Siedlungen verbunden sind: Dabei kann die Analyse privater Wohnsiedlungen als Club-
Ökonomien  die  ökonomische  Attraktivität  dieser  Wohnform  erklären.  Eine  politisch-
geographische  Betrachtung  der  privaten  Siedlungsorganisation  als  neue  Form  territorialer
Organisation  zeigt  allerdings,  dass  die  politischen  Entscheidungen  dabei  in  einer  Art
shareholder-Demokratie  getroffen  werden  und  soziale  Unterschiede  institutionell  verfestigt
werden.
INDEX
Schlüsselwörter: private Siedlungen, territoriale Club-ökonomien, öffentlicher Raum,
Privatisierung, lokale Demokratie, kommunale Verwaltung
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